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bar in 1889, and that he has been engaged in the practice of his profession constantly since that time; but, so far as the record shows, he has never given his attention to any other law business than that pertaining to divorce cases. This is his sole means of livelihood. He has a family. He has always been a good citizen and enjoyed the confidence and respect of people in his community. It is not claimed that he has ever overcharged or in any way taken advantage of his clients, or that he has ever practiced any fraud upon the courts of the state. On the other hand, his course of procedure has brought reproach upon the state abroad, and brought the bar and the courts of the state into disrepute at home. He appears to be without any sense of the proprieties or ethics of the profession.

"'The ethics of the profession forbid that an attorney should advertise his talents or his skill as a shopkeeper advertises his wares. An attorney may properly accept a retainer for the prosecution or defense of an action for divorce when convinced that his client has a good cause. But for any one to invite or encourage such litigation is most reprehensible.' People *v.* McCabe, 18 Colo. 186, 32 Pac. 280, 19 L. R. A. 231, 36 Am. St. Rep. 270.

"The practice of advertising or encouraging divorce litigations could hardly be condemned in stronger language, nor in our opinion could the condemnation be too strong. Re Schnitzer, 33 Nev. 581, 112 Pac. 848, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 941.

"To disbar defendant would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood after he has reached a time of life when it would be difficult for him to take up any other business. It is not at all likely that, if defendant is permitted to continue to practice law, he will ever again be guilty of any of the offenses charged in the complaint. But, on the other hand, his offense against the ethics of the profession has been too flagrant to be dismissed with a mere reprimand. To do so would be to reduce the case to a mere farce.

The judgment of the court will be that defendant will stand suspended from the right to practice in any court of record in this state for a period of six months from the entry of judgment herein."

Bailments—Liability for Stolen Automobile.—In Chastek *v.* Abertson, 191 Pac. 371, decided by the District Court of Appeal of California, it appeared that the owner of an automobile left his car with an automobile dealer, who was to examine and appraise it, and determine what amount could be allowed as a credit on a new automobile the owner contemplated purchasing from the dealer. The dealer took the machine, ran it into the central part of the city and left it at the curb. On his return, five or six minutes later, the car had been stolen.

The court said in part: "Appellants contend that the bailment was gratuitous; hence that a slight degree of care only was required of

them; and that the evidence did not show that they were guilty of gross negligence. The court determined that the bailment was for the mutual benefit of Chastek and defendants, and hence ordinary care was required to be exercised by the latter in protecting Chastek's property. We agree that this conclusion was the correct one to be drawn. The defendants received the automobile of Chastek in the course of the negotiation for a machine which they desired to sell to Chastek, and that they would be benefited by the transaction was only contingent upon an amount being agreed upon as a credit to be allowed Chastek which would be satisfactory to both sides.

"We think that the court was justified in concluding that ordinary care was not used for the protection of Chastek's automobile while it was in possession of the defendants. The machine was equipped with a lock, as to the operation of which Hoover, one of the defendants and the man who took charge of the machine, appeared to be familiar. Chastek delivered the key of the lock to Hoover, and when he turned the machine over in front of the place of business of the defendants the lock was fastened. Hoover took the automobile into the business section of a large city, left it unattended and unlocked, and it was stolen. With very simple means at hand by which the machine could have been made more secure in the place where he left it, Hoover omitted altogether to make use of this means. It would seem to be clear beyond question that such act of his by no means satisfied the requirement of ordinary care."

Contributory Negligence—Child Jumping on Moving Car. — In Kollentz *v.* Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 175 N. W. 929, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that where a boy 13 years old, of ordinary intelligence, jumped on a moving car and was struck by a signal near the track and injured, he was contributory negligent as a matter of law. The court said in part: "Appellant contends that the railroad company failed in the performance of its duty in its long acquiescence in the custom obtaining on the part of both boys and men of frequenting the right of way and jumping on moving freight trains and cars, without any protest against such custom on the part of the company, and without any effort on its part to stop or break up such custom and practice. We shall not consider the question of the negligence of the company, for the reason that whether or not the company was guilty of negligence, plaintiff must be held guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.

"We are thoroughly familiar with the principle that children of tender age are not held to that degree of care ordinarily exercised by adults, and that frequently conduct which would convict an adult of negligence as a matter of law raises but a jury question as to a child of tender years. However, this court has held children much younger than plaintiff in this case